Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited:Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges by Shay, Giovanna & O\u27Toole, Timothy
 109
MANSON v. BRATHWAITE REVISITED:  
TOWARDS A NEW RULE OF DECISION FOR 
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
Timothy P. O’Toole* and Giovanna Shay** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Almost 30 years ago, in Manson v. Brathwaite,1 the Supreme Court set 
out a test for determining when due process requires suppression of an 
out-of-court identification produced by suggestive police procedures.  
The Manson Court rejected a per se exclusion rule in favor of a test 
focusing on whether an identification infected by suggestive procedures 
is nonetheless reliable when judged in the totality of the circumstances.2  
The purpose of this Article is two-fold:  to demonstrate that the Manson 
rule of decision fails to safeguard due process values, in part because it 
does not account for the intervening social science research, and to 
initiate a conversation about how a more effective rule of decision could 
be constructed.   
To use the vocabulary introduced by Professor Mitchell Berman and 
employed by Professor Kermit Roosevelt, the Manson Court identified 
both an operative constitutional proposition and a rule of decision for 
due process challenges to identification procedures.3  The operative 
constitutional proposition identified by the Manson Court was that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “fairness” in 
identification procedures, and, specifically, “reliability.”4  “[R]eliability is 
the linchpin,” Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court.5  The Manson rule of 
decision thus provides that, even if a procedure is determined to be 
unnecessarily suggestive, results will nonetheless be admitted if they are 
deemed reliable based on five factors:  “the opportunity of the witness to 
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1 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
2 Id. at 113-14. 
3 Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004).  See also Meir 
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); Richard H. Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1305-06 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt, 
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1653 (2005). 
4 432 U.S. at 113. 
5 Id. at 114. 
110 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’s degree of 
attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level 
of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the 
crime and the confrontation.”6   
Sadly, the rule of decision set out in Manson has failed to meet the 
Court’s objective of furthering fairness and reliability.  The results have 
been tragic.  Since 1989, 340 people have been exonerated in the United 
States after having previously been convicted by juries of serious crimes.7  
Media reports of exonerations have now become commonplace.8  
Mistaken eyewitness identification was a leading cause of these 
wrongful convictions, by one estimate accounting for 88% of the 
erroneous rape convictions and 50% of the false murder convictions.9  
The Department of Justice has issued a report analyzing twenty-eight 
DNA exonerations and concluded that inaccurate eyewitness testimony 
was “the most compelling evidence” in the majority of these cases.10  
Questions have been raised about whether Texas executed an innocent 
teenager, Ruben Cantu, in 1993, after police allegedly pressured the only 
eyewitness, an illegal immigrant who was shown Cantu’s photograph 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005).  See also Michael L. Radelet, William S. Lofquist & Hugo 
Adam Bedau, Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their 
Guilt, 13 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 907, 916 (1996) (describing 68 cases of death row 
inmates “later released because of doubts about their guilt”). 
8 See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 275-76 (2001); 
LOLA VOLLEN & DAVE EGGERS, SURVIVING JUSTICE:  AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 
AND EXECUTED (2005).  See, e.g., John M. Broder, Starting Over, 24 Years After a Wrongful 
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at A13; David Firestone, DNA Test Brings Freedom, 16 
Years After Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at A22; Colin Garrett, Another DNA 
Exoneration, Another Death Row Inmate Freed, 28 CHAMPION 47 (2004); Adam Liptak, Houston 
DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in Texas Could Be Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2003, at A14; Barbara Novovitch, Free After 17 Years for a Rape that He Did Not Commit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at A22. 
9 Gross et al., supra note 7, at 544.  See Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful 
Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337 (2006) 
(discussing the role that mistaken eyewitness identification played in the wrongful 
conviction of David Wong and potential reforms to eyewitness identification procedures 
generally); Arnold H. Loewy, Systemic Changes that Could Reduce the Conviction of the 
Innocent 4-5 (Aug. 30, 2006) UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 927223, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927223. 
10 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 28 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf 
[hereinafter NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY 
SCIENCE]. 
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repeatedly, to identify the boy.11  Even the “blue” state of Connecticut 
has been affected:  earlier this year, James Tillman was exonerated by 
DNA evidence in a 1988 sexual assault case based on eyewitness 
identification.12 
The Ronald Cotton case, a DNA exoneration, provides a particularly 
compelling example of the dangers of mistaken identification.  In the 
early morning hours of July 29, 1984, an intruder sexually assaulted a 
college student named Jennifer Thompson in her North Carolina home.13  
Two days later, Ms. Thompson viewed a photo array containing six 
pictures, one of them of a man named Ronald Cotton.14  Ms. Thompson 
initially chose two pictures from the array, including Cotton’s photo.15  
She examined these two pictures and told police that Cotton’s photo 
“looks most like” the assailant.16  About a week later, Ms. Thompson 
viewed a live line-up in which Cotton was the only participant whose 
picture also had been in the photo array.17  Ms. Thompson was told to 
pick the man who looked the most like her assailant.18  She told police 
that she was deciding between participants numbers four and five, but 
stated that number five “looks the most like him.”19  In 1986, Ms. 
Thompson testified at trial, and again identified Mr. Cotton, who was 
convicted.20  Describing these events years later, Ms. Thompson said, “I 
knew this was the man.  I was completely confident.  I was sure.”21  In 
1987, Ms. Thompson again identified Mr. Cotton when he was granted a 
new trial.22  At the retrial, she told authorities that she had never seen 
another man, Bobby Poole, who claimed to be her attacker.23  Eleven 
years after Ms. Thompson’s first identification, in 1995, Ronald Cotton 
                                                 
11 Lise Olsen, The Cantu Case: Death and Doubt.  Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?  
Eyewitness Says He Felt Influenced by Police to ID the Teen as the Killer, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Nov. 20, 2005, at A1. 
12 Matt Burgard, His Challenge Now: Freedom (Wrongly Convicted, Tillman is Formally 
Exonerated), HARTFORD COURANT, July 12, 2006, at A1; Matt Burgard  & Elizabeth 
Hamilton, Dogged Pursuit Freed Inmate: Lawyers Kept Up Hunt Until Finding Key DNA, 
HARTFORD COURANT, June 11, 2006, at A1; Lisa Siegel, Connecticut Innocence Project 
Discovers Wrongful Conviction, CONN. L. TRIB., June 6, 2006. 
13 State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456, 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). 
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was exonerated by DNA evidence.24  DNA testing demonstrated that 
Bobby Poole—who ultimately pled guilty to the rape of Jennifer 
Thompson—was the real culprit.25  Writing years after the exoneration, 
Jennifer Thompson said, “I live with constant anguish that my profound 
mistake cost [Mr. Cotton] so dearly.”26 
Exonerations like Ronald Cotton’s have illustrated what many have 
long suspected: eyewitnesses make mistakes in identifying strangers.27  
Of course, there are no doubt many more cases in which innocent people 
were convicted based on faulty eyewitness identification, but never 
exonerated. For obvious reasons, DNA exonerations are more common 
in crimes involving sexual assault than in, for example, shootings or 
purse-snatchings.28  And due to scarce resources, usually only the most 
serious convictions are afforded the level of scrutiny that can produce a 
conclusive exoneration.  Nonetheless, even an under-reported rate of 
exonerations suggests that protections designed to vet the reliability of 
eyewitness identification evidence—and of most interest here the 
Manson due process test—are not up to the task.29 
The most obvious problem with the Manson rule is that the factors it 
sets out have proven not to be good indicators of reliability.  Indeed, 
Manson is a prime example of Professor Kermit Roosevelt’s observation 
that, “decision rules that made sense when adopted may lose their fit.”30  
During the past three decades, and at an increasing pace over the past 
ten to fifteen years, research has demonstrated that some of the Manson 
reliability factors can be skewed by faulty police practices, and that the 





28 SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 8, at XV. 
29 The most recent experience in Virginia shows the number of wrongful convictions 
produced by eyewitness identifications may be substantial.  In 2004, Governor Mark 
Warner ordered scientists to conduct DNA testing on a small, randomly selected 
percentage of sexual assault cases tried between 1973 and 1988 to determine if more 
widespread DNA testing of the hundreds of convictions obtained during that time would 
be warranted.  Of the thirty-one cases reviewed, two exonerations occurred.  In other 
words, 6% of the randomly sampled cases tested resulted in exonerations.  Predictably, 
both Virginia exonerations involved convictions that relied heavily on eyewitness 
testimony.  See Michael D. Shear & Jamie Stockwell, DNA Tests Exonerate 2 Former Prisoners, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at A01. 
30 Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1686-87. 
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list as a whole is substantially incomplete.31  Psychologists, including 
Gary L. Wells, Elizabeth Loftus, Brian Cutler, Steven Penrod, and others, 
have conducted studies demonstrating that human memory for 
strangers’ faces is fallible and identifying the circumstances in which 
people’s ability to remember strangers’ faces is particularly prone to 
error.32  In fact, studies indicate that:  eyewitnesses are vulnerable to 
suggestion;33 their confidence in their picks is not necessarily strongly 
correlated with their accuracy;34 and their confidence level is malleable 
and can be infected by suggestive procedures.35   
The problem with the Manson rule of decision, however, runs even 
deeper than any issues with individual reliability factors.  The Manson 
factors have become reduced to a checklist to determine reliability, and a 
checklist is a poor means of making a subtle, fact-intensive, and case-
specific determination as to whether a given eyewitness identification is 
reliable, despite the use of suggestive police procedures.  Even if an 
eyewitness identification meets all five of the Manson factors, it may still 
prove to be unreliable for reasons that the Manson Court could not have 
imagined.  Yet, because the Court has decreed a litmus test—or at least 
because the lower courts have read the Court’s decree that way—the 
unreliable identification will be admitted.  Indeed, the Manson factors 
have been reified.  As described below in Part IV, in the minds of many 
courts, it appears that there can be no due process problem if a number 
of these factors can be gleaned from the record.  This mode of operating 
is akin to the phenomenon of “constitutional calcification” described by 
Professor Roosevelt:  an outmoded rule of decision is mistaken for a 
constitutional operative proposition.36 
                                                 
31 Gary Wells, What is Wrong With the Manson v. Brathwaite Test of Eyewitness 
Identification Accuracy?, www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/homepage.htm (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Wells, What is Wrong]. 
32 See Gary Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, 29 CHAMPION 12 
(2005) [hereinafter Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence] (surveying the psychological 
literature in this area); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 277 (2003). 
33 See Bill Nettles, Zoe Sanders Nettles & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: “I Notice 
You Paused on Number Three,” 20 CHAMPION 10, 11 (1996). 
34 See Gary L. Wells, Elizabeth A. Olson & Steve D. Charman, The Confidence of 
Eyewitnesses in Their Identifications from Lineups, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 151, 
151 (2002). 
35 See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to 
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 
360 (1998). 
36 Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1692-93. 
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Criticism of the Manson rule has come from many quarters and taken 
varied forms.  For years, psychologists have attempted to make their 
research findings known to the legal and criminal justice communities, 
and to change police procedures.37  Naturally, defense attorneys also 
have sought to use this research to their best advantage, attempting to 
get experts admitted to discuss the failings of eyewitness identification, 
or to have juries instructed that eyewitnesses can be mistaken.38   
Legal commentators have criticized the Manson test as a poor way of 
determining which identifications should be excluded at trial on grounds 
of unreliability.39  Some have suggested that the Court adopt a rule of 
per se exclusion of identifications that are the product of suggestive 
police procedures,40 loosen the standards for admitting expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification,41 require corroboration for eyewitness 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of 
Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 581 (2000) (documenting collaboration of the 
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence that resulted in the 1999 National 
Institute of Justice report, Eyewitness Evidence:  A Guide for Law Enforcement); Wells, 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra note 32; Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 618 
(1998) [hereinafter Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures]; Gary L. Wells, Police 
Lineups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 791 (2001). 
38 See, e.g., Lisa Steele, Trying Identification Cases: An Outline for Raising Eyewitness ID 
Issues, 28 CHAMPION 8 (2004). 
39 Suzannah B. Gambell, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing 
Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189 (2006); Steven P. Grossman, 
Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court’s Due Process Test Fails to Meet Its Own Criteria, 
11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 58 (1981); David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: 
A Proposal To Return to the Wade Trilogy’s Standard, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 605 (1987); 
Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial 
Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 275 (1991); Ruth Yacona, 
Manson v. Brathwaite: The Supreme Court’s Misunderstanding of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2006); Keith Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases 347-48 (June 2006), University of Wisconsin Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 1023, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
911240. 
40 Paseltiner, supra note 39, at 605; Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 306, 314; Yacona, supra 
note 39, at 595-60.  See also Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act 
Won’t—Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identification, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 264 
(2002). 
41 Robert J. Hallisey, Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court—A Short Historical 
Perspective, 39 HOW. L.J. 237, 238 (1995); Connie Mayer, Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness 
Identification Based on Pretrial Photographic Arrays, 13 PACE L. REV. 815, 859 (1994); 
Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 310; Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to 
the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992); Cindy T. O’Hagan, Note, 
When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 755 
(1993); David M. Shofi, Comment, The New York Courts’ Lack of Direction and Discretion 
Regarding the Admissibility of Expert Identification Testimony, 13 PACE L. REV. 1101, 1132 
(1994). 
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identifications in some circumstances,42 or mandate certain police 
procedures.43   
Some state courts have attempted to respond to the criticism of 
Manson by interpreting their state constitution or other state law to 
provide more protection than Manson.  Utah and Kansas have adopted a 
refined version of the Manson test on state law grounds, using reliability 
factors that have a firmer grounding in the social science.44  New York 
and Massachusetts require the automatic suppression of unnecessarily 
suggestive identification procedures.45  Wisconsin requires suppression 
of show-up identifications, in which a single suspect is presented to the 
witness, unless the use of the procedure was necessary under the 
circumstances.46  Citing the Dubose decision, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has recently indicated a willingness to consider a state 
constitutional claim based on the psychological research if a record is 
made in the trial court.47   
State courts have also attempted to mitigate the effects of Manson 
through other measures, like special jury instructions.  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court recently used its supervisory authority to mandate a 
special jury instruction in cases that the police failed to inform the 
witness that the suspect might not be present in the photo array or line-
up.48  The Georgia Supreme Court has directed that trial courts should 
no longer instruct jurors to consider the eyewitness’s confidence in 
evaluating his identification.49  New Jersey has mandated a special 
instruction on cross-racial identification in some cases.50  Most recently, 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., Radha Natarjan, Racialized Memory and Reliability:  Due Process Applied to 
Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1845-48 (2003). 
43 See, e.g., Jake Sussman, Suspect Choices: Lineup Procedures and the Abdication of Judicial 
Authority, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 507, 508 (2001-02). 
44 State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 577 (Kan. 2003); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-81 
(Utah 1991). 
45 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423 
N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981). 
46 See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 596-97 (Wis. 2005). 
47 State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 180-81 (N.J. 2006). 
48 See, e.g., State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2005) (rejecting Defendant’s claim that 
Connecticut Constitution required abandonment of Biggers factors and instead mandating 
that, in situations in which line-up administrator failed to instruct witness that suspect may 
not be present in the line-up, trial court charge jury regarding the risk of misidentification). 
49 See, e.g., Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005) (recognizing that it is error for 
trial courts to instruct jurors to consider a witness’s confidence in evaluating the credibility 
of their identification). 
50 State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999) (“A cross-racial instruction should be 
given only when, as in the present case, identification is a critical issue in the case, and an 
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the New Jersey Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority to 
mandate that law enforcement officers make a written record 
documenting the out-of-court identification procedure, “including the 
place where the procedure was conducted, the dialogue between the 
witness and the interlocutor, and the results.”51  
In recent years, local legislatures and law enforcement agencies have 
made efforts to improve identification procedures.  The National 
Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has 
published a report on DNA exonerations52 and two guides on protocols 
for conducting eyewitness identifications.53  States, including New 
Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin, and cities, including Seattle and 
Minneapolis, have adopted police procedures for line-ups based on best 
practices from psychological literature.54  Despite all of the criticism and 
reform efforts, however, the nation’s highest Court has yet to confront 
the need to overhaul Manson’s outdated rule.  Advocates are increasingly 
calling on the Court to do just that.55  This Article attempts to 
demonstrate that Manson must be revisited, and to open a conversation 
about what rule of decision would best further the operative 
constitutional propositions of “fairness” and “reliability” identified by 
the Manson Court.   
Any new rule of decision should, as Professors Meares and Harcourt 
have argued, take account of the considerable social science research in 
                                                                                                             
eyewitness’s cross-racial identification is not corroborated by other evidence giving it 
independent reliability.”). 
51 State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 897 (N.J. 2006). 
52 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE, supra 
note 10. 
53 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf. 
54 Karin Brulliard, Revamping Virginia’s Police Lineups, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at C01; 
Gina Kim, Police Lineups’ Flaws Spur New Approach, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2005, at CN1; Gina 
Kolata & Iver Peterson, New Jersey Is Trying New Way for Witnesses To Say, “It’s Him,”  N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A1.  See also Scott Ehlers, Eyewitness Identification: State Law Reform, 
29 CHAMPION 34 (2005) (surveying state legislative reform efforts); Gary L. Wells, 
Eyewitness Identification:  Systematic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615 (2006) [hereinafter Wells, 
Systematic Reforms]. 
55 The authors are aware of at least two cert petitions filed this year asking the United 
States Supreme Court to reexamine Manson.  See Perez v. United States, No. 05-596, 2005 
WL 3038542 (Nov. 10, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1464 (2006) (arguing that the certainty 
factor must be reconsidered in light of psychological research and state courts’ rejections of 
it); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1798 (2006). 
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this area.56  How should such a rule be constructed?  The new rule 
should provide affirmative minimum guidelines for the conduct of 
identification procedures—what some term “prophylactic rules.”  
Professor Susan Klein has argued that eyewitness identification 
procedures are a “prime candidate” for the implementation of 
prophylactic rules.57  Such rules would provide clear guidance to law 
enforcement and easily administrable tests for trial courts.  Moreover, as 
Professor Klein has pointed out, affirmative minimum guidelines would 
improve eyewitness identification procedures, and reduce the likelihood 
of mistaken identification.58 
Prophylactic rules are particularly helpful in a situation in which 
case-by-case adjudication is unwieldy. The classic example is the 
Supreme Court’s Miranda decision. Numerous commentators have noted 
that Miranda replaced an unmanageably fact-intensive voluntariness 
decision with clear rules.59  Because it requires case-by-case reliability 
determinations, the Manson rule of decision shares the weaknesses of the 
pre-Miranda voluntariness regime—it is both resource-intensive and 
poorly-suited to courts’ capacities.  In much the same way that the 
Miranda warnings have provided clear guidance, a rule of decision 
instituting minimum affirmative guidelines for identification 
procedures—based on the psychological research—would provide better 
guidance for both police and trial courts.   
Such guidelines could draw on the numerous models and 
recommendations that have been issued about eyewitness identification 
practices.60  They would require that police implement double-blind 
procedures, use non-suspect fillers chosen to minimize suggestivity, 
separate witnesses, caution witnesses that the culprit may not appear in 
the line-up or photo array, avoid exposing the witness to multiple line-
                                                 
56 Tracey L. Meares & Bernard Harcourt, Supreme Court Review: Transparent Adjudication 
and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
733, 743, 797 (2000).  In recent years the Court has demonstrated a willingness to consider 
research findings in revisiting constitutional rules.  Id.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 nn.23-24 (2002) (drawing on 
psychological literature to determine that Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the 
mentally retarded and juveniles). 
57 Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and 
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1064-65 (2001). 
58 Id. 
59 Fallon, supra note 3, at 1305-06; Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1671-72; David A. Strauss, 
The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 208-09 (1988). 
60 See supra notes 37-54. 
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up procedures with the same suspect, and ask witnesses to make a 
statement of their certainty at the time they make a pick. 
The proposed rule of decision permits continued innovation.  
Professor Klein has pointed out that prophylactic rules may be changed 
as social science evolves or state officials produce alternative solutions.61  
Congress cannot “simply erase” prophylactic rules, Professor Roosevelt 
has written, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of 
Miranda in Dickerson.62  Nonetheless, legislatures and local governments 
can experiment with alternative methods of safeguarding the 
constitutional right at issue, provided they do not fall below the floor set 
out by the prophylactic rule.63 
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the problems with the 
Manson rule of decision.  In Part II, the psychological research that has 
been conducted in the nearly three decades since Manson was decided is 
outlined.  Part III discusses the development of the Manson rule of 
decision in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In Part IV, the way that 
Manson typifies what Professor Roosevelt described as the “poor fit” 
between a constitutionally operative proposition and a rule of decision is 
described.64  Finally, Part V returns to a more detailed defense of the 
proposed solution—minimum affirmative guidelines for identification 
procedures.    
II.  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
In the time since the Supreme Court decided Manson, psychologists 
have made great strides in understanding how people remember 
strangers’ faces, and, specifically, some of the factors that cause mistaken 
identifications.  The fundamental problem is that human perception and 
memory do not work like a video recorder—while a camera simply 
stores information for later recall, human memory is both subjective and 
malleable.65  Professor Wells has described eyewitness identification 
evidence as a form of “trace evidence”; instead of leaving a physical 
trace like blood stains or fingerprints, eyewitness evidence leaves a 
                                                 
61 Klein, supra note 57, at 1060. 
62 Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1672 (discussing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000)). 
63 Id. at 1671-72. 
64 Id. at 1692-93. 
65 D.A. Louw & A. Venter, The Relationship Between Memory and the Recall of Specific 
Details, 23 MED. & L. 625, 626 (2004). 
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“memory trace” in the mind of the observer.66  The question is how to 
extract this evidence without damaging it.67  
Researchers have identified a number of sources of error in 
eyewitness evidence.  For example, psychologists have documented a 
“relative judgment” dynamic affecting simultaneous lineups, which are 
lineups in which all suspects are presented to the witness at the same 
time.68  The relative-judgment process occurs when the witness selects 
the member of the lineup who most resembles his or her memory of the 
culprit, relative to the other members of the lineup.69  An experiment 
using two photo spreads—one containing the culprit and one from 
which the culprit was absent—demonstrated that once the culprit was 
removed from the photo array, many witnesses simply picked another 
person, presumably the one that they thought looked the most like the 
culprit.70  It is for this reason that researchers have recommended 
instructing witnesses that the culprit might not be present in the lineup, 
a simple measure demonstrated in one experiment to reduce mistaken 
identifications from 78% to 33%.71 Psychologists also have recommended 
that law enforcement authorities use sequential lineups, in which the 
witness is shown a series of suspects, one at a time, and asked to make a 
decision about each one individually.72   
Another problem that psychologists have documented in the context 
of lineups and photo arrays is the “experimenter-expectancy” effect, in 
which the person conducting the identification procedure—whether 
consciously or unconsciously—directs the witness’s attention to the 
suspect.73  In order to combat this problem, researchers have 
recommended that law enforcement agencies implement “double-blind” 
procedures for conducting lineups or photo arrays, in which the 
detective conducting the identification procedure does not know which 
person is the suspect.74  Psychologists point out that “double-blind” 
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procedures are standard in scientific experiments, and that identification 
procedures are properly considered a type of experiment.75 
The relationship between an eyewitness’s confidence and his or her 
accuracy—of great relevance to one of the Manson factors—has been the 
subject of extensive research.76  The confidence-accuracy correlation 
varies depending on the circumstances, but many studies indicate that, 
even at its highest, it is fairly modest.77  Some studies indicate that, in 
poor witnessing conditions, the correlation between confidence and 
accuracy can be non-significant, or even negative.78  A recent study co-
authored between Professor Gary Wells and Professor Neil Brewer 
suggests that confidence statements made at the time of the identification 
may be meaningful, but Professors Wells and Brewer caution that the 
same is probably not true of confidence statements made in court.  They 
explain that the confidence statements in their study were “protected 
from the biasing effects of any of the typical social influences that can . . . 
operate between the time of making an identification and giving 
testimony in the courtroom”79   
This distinction is significant because the most troubling aspect of 
eyewitness confidence is that it is highly malleable.  For example, 
seemingly innocuous confirmatory feedback to the witness from the 
person conducting the line-up, (“Good, you got him!” or “You got the 
right guy.”) has been demonstrated to increase confidence.80  Even 
routine procedures can enhance confidence artificially:  briefing the 
witness about the types of questions to expect on cross-examination,81 
questioning the witness repeatedly,82 or telling the witness that another 
witness picked the same suspect.83  Unfortunately, many of these effects 
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have been demonstrated to inflate the certainty of inaccurate witnesses 
more than that of accurate witnesses.84   
Most disturbing, post-identification feedback from the line-up 
administrator not only inflates a witness’s certainty about her choice, but 
also affects her perception of her opportunity to view the event.85  “For 
example, confirming feedback has been shown to influence witnesses’ 
accounts of how much attention they paid to the face of a perpetrator, 
how good their view was, and how well they thought they made out the 
details of the perpetrator’s face.”86   
A confirming-feedback remark not only inflates the 
eyewitnesses’ recollections of how confident they were 
at the time, it also leads them to report that they had a 
better view of the culprit, that they could make out 
details of the face, that they were able to easily and 
quickly pick him out of a lineup, that his face just 
“popped out” to them, that their memorial image of the 
gunman is particularly clear, and that they are adept at 
recognizing faces of strangers.87   
The problems with the Manson rule of decision are fairly obvious in 
light of the psychological research, and have been described by Professor 
Gary Wells in a forthcoming article.88  Three of the five Manson factors—
the witness’s opportunity to view, the witness’s degree of attention, and 
the witness’s level of certainty—are generally self-reported by the 
witness, and self-reports of memory are “notoriously unreliable.”89  The 
witness’s level of certainty is suspect because, as discussed above, the 
confidence-accuracy correlation is weak.90  Moreover, the witness’s 
assessment of her confidence, her opportunity to view, and her degree of 
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attention may all be distorted by post-identification feedback from the 
police, repeated questioning, or preparation to testify.91   
Even more fundamentally, as Professor Wells pointed out, the 
Manson inquiry is flawed because the suggestive nature of the police 
procedures actually taints the reliability factors, thus undermining the 
intended purpose of the second step of the analysis.92  In other words, 
the factors that should provide an independent assurance that an 
identification was not tainted by suggestive police procedures are 
themselves infected by the suggestive identification methods.  Put 
another way, the Manson rule of decision is self-fulfilling. 
III. THE MANSON RULE OF DECISION 
How did the Court arrive at the Manson rule of decision with these 
five factors that are now so problematic?  In Manson, the Court adopted 
what Professor Charles Pulaski termed in a prescient 1974 article a 
“permissive construction of the due process test.”93  Manson constituted a 
type of compromise—a step backward from the protections that the 
Court had instituted in a trilogy of 1967 eyewitness identification 
decisions.   
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided three eyewitness identification 
cases—United States v. Wade,94 Gilbert v. California,95 and Stovall v. 
Denno.96  Wade instituted what some consider a type of prophylactic 
rule,97 concluding that the Sixth Amendment entitled the defendant to 
the assistance of counsel at a post-indictment line-up.98  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Wade Court noted the “vagaries of eyewitness 
identification”99 and the “potential for improper influence” at line-ups,100 
concluding that the “presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice 
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and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial.”101  Citing Miranda, the 
Wade Court noted that its decision was not meant to stifle reform of 
identification procedures, and that it “‘in no way creates a constitutional 
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it 
intended to have this effect.’”102 
In Wade and its companion case, Gilbert, the Supreme Court 
addressed when the government could nonetheless introduce in-court 
identifications despite earlier uncounseled out-of-court identifications by 
the same witness.  The Gilbert Court held that the government could only 
introduce the in-court identifications if it demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence that they “were based upon observations of the 
suspect other than the lineup identification”103 (i.e., had an independent 
source).104  Thus, if the prosecution could satisfy this hurdle, it could 
elicit an in-court identification, even if it could not “bolster” the in-court 
identification with evidence of a tainted out-of-court identification.105  
In the final case of the Wade trilogy, Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme 
Court said that the Wade rule was not retroactive.  The Stovall Court 
criticized a show-up identification procedure that was used in that case, 
but concluded that, although suggestive, it did not constitute a violation 
of due process based on the “totality of the circumstances,” in which “an 
immediate hospital confrontation” between the critically-wounded 
victim and the suspect was “imperative.”106 
The following year, in Simmons v. United States, the Supreme Court 
seemed to shift the Stovall formulation substantially.107  In considering 
whether a photo identification procedure violated due process, the Court 
cited Stovall for the proposition that the procedure there had not been 
“unnecessary”—a description that seemed to accurately reflect Stovall’s 
holding—but then went on to examine the circumstances surrounding 
the identification itself, ultimately concluding that they “leave little room 
for doubt that the identification of Simmons was correct.”108  As 
Professor Pulaski has explained, the “reworded language of the Simmons 
due process test . . . suggested a very different inquiry.”109  Instead of 
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focusing solely on the necessity and suggestivity of the procedures used 
by police, the Court then asked the far broader question of how likely it 
was that the eyewitness misidentified the defendant.  The Simmons due 
process test “attributed critical importance to the nature and extent of the 
witness’s ability to observe the offender at the scene of the crime, a factor 
Stovall did not consider.”110 
Thus, as explained by Professor Pulaski, after Simmons, there existed 
two competing versions of the due process test for eyewitness 
identification.  The “strict” construction as exemplified by Stovall 
weighed the “suggestiveness of the proceeding against the necessity for 
its use.”111  The “permissive” construction exemplified by Simmons 
declined to deem suggestive procedures due process violations “if the 
witness had an opportunity at the time of the crime to identify the 
offender accurately.”112 The second, more permissive approach 
conceived of the due process rule “as a protection against the admission 
of unreliable evidence, rather than as a bar to the use of unreliable 
procedures.”113 
In 1972, in Neil v. Biggers, the Supreme Court adopted the permissive 
construction of the due process case, at least with respect to pre-Stovall 
cases.114  The Court reasoned that, since the offense and trial in Biggers 
occurred prior to the Court’s decision in Stovall, deterrence of police 
misconduct—one of the major rationales for the “strict” formulation—
was not an issue.115  The Biggers Court concluded that a show-up did not 
violate due process if “under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the 
identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was 
suggestive.”116  The Court identified for the first time  
the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood 
of misidentification includ[ing] the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ 
prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty 
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demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and 
the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation.117 
Writing in 1974, between the Court’s decisions in Biggers and 
Manson, Professor Pulaski warned that adopting the Biggers test for post-
Stovall cases would “eliminate whatever incentives remained . . . to 
adopt standardized regulations describing how the police should 
conduct identification procedures.”118  “So long as the prosecution can 
demonstrate that the witness had some opportunity to observe the 
offender at the time of the crime,” he explained, “the witness can make 
an in-court identification and can testify concerning the pretrial 
identification regardless of the suggestiveness of the pretrial 
proceedings.”119   
The Manson v. Brathwaite case in 1977 represented the final gasp of 
the pure suggestivity/necessity approach previously followed in Stovall.  
In Manson, the Supreme Court weighed the suggestivity/necessity per se 
rule of Stovall against the reliability/totality of the circumstances 
approach of Simmons and Biggers and opted for a reliability-based 
approach, holding that “reliability is the linchpin” in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall 
confrontations.120  Manson concluded that “[t]he factors to be considered 
are set out in Biggers.”121  Thus, the “permissive” construction of the Due 
Process Clause—with its emphasis on overall reliability of the 
identification, rather than on the impermissibly suggestive nature of the 
procedures used—became the test for all out-of-court identification 
challenges. 
Four years after Manson, another decision of the Supreme Court 
watered down the Manson reliability approach even more than Professor 
Pulaski had feared.  In Watkins v. Sowders, the Supreme Court said that a 
defendant challenging the reliability of an identification produced by 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures had no entitlement to a separate, 
pretrial hearing to determine reliability.122  “[T]he proper evaluation of 
evidence under the instructions of the trial judge is the very task our 
system must assume juries can perform[,]” the Supreme Court wrote in 
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Watkins.123  “[T]he only duty of a jury in cases in which identification 
evidence has been admitted will often be to assess the reliability of that 
evidence[,]” the Court reasoned.124  Thus, under Watkins, the 
determination of whether the witness had adequate opportunity to 
observe the offender can be made by the jury.  Therefore, the due process 
analysis is nearly indistinguishable from a general credibility 
determination, and the one real judicial check on the untethered use of 
unreliable identifications that Manson had seemed to provide is 
removed. 
In his 1974 article, Professor Pulaski warned that the rule of decision 
ultimately adopted in Manson would create incentives for trial courts to 
admit identifications that were the product of suggestive procedures.  
“The Neil [v. Biggers] decision suggests that the constitutionally 
required quantum of evidence necessary to surmount due process 
objections to identification confrontations is quite small[,]” he wrote.125  
He continued, “[S]ome trial judges may very well conclude that finding 
the ‘elemental facts’ in the defendant’s favor entails a relatively greater 
risk of reversal on appeal than does finding those facts in favor of the 
prosecution.”126  Sadly, thirty years of experience with the Manson rule of 
decision has borne out Professor Pulaski’s prediction that the Biggers test 
later adopted in Manson would “reduce[ ] the due process test to a handy 
device by which courts can legitimately overlook suggestive 
confrontations.”127  
IV.  THE “POOR FIT” BETWEEN THE MANSON RULE OF DECISION AND THE 
OPERATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSITIONS OF FAIRNESS AND RELIABILITY 
In this part, a number of lower court opinions are discussed to 
demonstrate, again using Professor Roosevelt’s terms, the “poor fit” of 
the Manson rule of decision with the constitutionally operative 
propositions of fairness and reliability.128  These cases illustrate 
numerous police actions that are unnecessarily suggestive:  using show-
ups, including a suspect’s photograph in repeated identification 
procedures, questioning witnesses repeatedly, allowing witnesses to 
remain together when making their picks, and otherwise suggesting by 
comments or actions that the police believe the suspect to be the culprit.  
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Many of these suggestive procedures could have been avoided by 
simply implementing double-blind procedures.   
The point here, however, is not merely to provide examples of police 
missteps. It is to illustrate that the Manson rule of decision fails to achieve 
the purpose of furthering fairness and reliability because many of the so-
called reliability factors are not good proxies for accuracy (for example, 
subjective statements of certainty), because suggestive police procedures 
can infect the factors that allegedly guarantee reliability, and because an 
overall reliability determination cannot be made effectively by picking 
out certain factors in isolation.  In a world in which a determination of 
reliability based on the totality of the circumstances is costly, many 
courts are applying Manson in a way that is rote and mechanistic. 
A. Federal Court Decisions 
In United States v. Wong, a case involving the prosecution of a Green 
Dragon gang member in a restaurant shooting, the Second Circuit 
concluded that an identification was reliable despite the fact that the 
witness had seen the shooter for only a few seconds as she ducked under 
the table, and later expressed doubts.129  The witness in Wong viewed 
three photo arrays and picked Wong out of the third array, saying the 
photo “looked like the shooter.”130  At the first lineup, the witness 
indicated that the defendant “looked like him” but that she couldn’t be 
sure “because of the height.”  At that point, the detectives told her, “we 
can’t just take a ‘possibly,’” and dimmed the lights, ostensibly to make 
the lighting more like the lighting in the restaurant.131  The witness then 
identified Wong, although she said he was “taller than she remembered 
the gunman to be.”132  Despite the witness’s clear inability to identify the 
shooter without substantial coaching and the detectives’ having 
repeatedly communicated their belief to the witness that they had the 
right man, the Second Circuit concluded that the detectives’ actions had 
not rendered the lineup impermissibly suggestive, and that, even if they 
had, the identification was nonetheless reliable because the witness 
“observed the gunman after she ducked under the table at the 
restaurant, staring him in the face for ‘two to three seconds’ before he 
turned away.”133 
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In Clark v. Caspari,134 the Eighth Circuit found reliable identifications 
by two liquor store clerks who had viewed the two handcuffed African-
American suspects “surrounded by white police officers, one of whom 
was holding a shotgun.”135  The Court focused on three factors:  both 
clerks had come face-to-face with the robbers during the robbery; only 
thirty minutes had elapsed between robbery and show-up; and the 
police had refrained from saying anything expressly suggestive to the 
witnesses at the show-up.136  “Although the record reveals that the police 
may have made several inquiries about the identity of the suspects 
before receiving a positive identification,” the Court wrote, “there is no 
evidence to suggest that their questions were designed to elicit a 
particular response.”137 Thus, despite classic and completely unnecessary 
suggestivity in the show-up, and repeated questioning by the police, the 
Court determined that the identifications were reliable because the 
suspects were rounded up quickly and the detectives did not verbalize 
their obvious belief that they had apprehended the culprit.   
In Howard v. Bouchard,138 the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that 
seeing the defendant in court at the defense table with his counsel about 
one hour before the lineup could have unduly infected witnesses’ 
identifications, terming this lapse only “minimally suggestive.”139  
Applying Manson, the court concluded that the identifications were 
reliable despite the fact that the eyewitnesses had been passing by in a 
moving truck in an area lit by street lamps at the time of the early-
morning shooting, and had seen the shooter only during three intervals 
ranging from “a split-second” to “about a minute and a half,” at 
distances ranging from three to forty feet.140  The Seventh Circuit reached 
this conclusion in part based on the fact that “the eyewitnesses were 
participating in a repossession, which by its stressful nature generally 
demands heightened attention[,]”141 and based on the witnesses’ 
subjective expressions of certainty.142  
                                                 
134 274 F.3d 507 (8th Cir. 2002). 
135 Id. at 511. 
136 Id. at 512. 
137 Id. 
138 405 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005). 
139 Id. at 470. 
140 Id. at 472-73. 
141 Id. at 473. 
142 Id. 
2006] Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited 129 
B. State Court Decisions 
The Manson rule of decision also produces rote and unconvincing 
analysis in state court opinions.  An example is State v. Thompson,143 in 
which the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed the denial of a 
motion to suppress an identification, despite the fact that the police 
officer who had transported the witness to the show-up had asked the 
witness to make an identification of the person who was “probably the 
shooter.”144  The officer told the witness:  “‘[W]e believe we have the 
person.  We need you to identify him.’”145  The police drove the witness 
in a police car to the location where the suspect had been 
apprehended.146  Training spotlights and headlights on the defendant, 
they removed him from the back of the police car for a show-up.147  The 
trial court denied the defense motion to suppress, noting that the witness 
had a “good, hard look,” the identification occurred less than two hours 
after the shooting,148 and the witness was very certain of his 
identification.149  On appeal, despite the fact that the state conceded that 
the show-up was unnecessarily suggestive,150 the Appellate Court 
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the identification was reliable, 
citing precedent that, “a good hard look will pass muster even if it occurs 
during a fleeting glance.”151  Additionally, the appellate court also noted 
that the witness had indicated “a high level of certainty” in his 
identification,152 but did not address how the officers’ comments could 
have inflated the witness’s subjective assessment of his certainty. 
In State v. Johnson,153 an Ohio case, a juvenile murder defendant, 
Brandon Johnson, was identified by the decedent’s wife at a “bind-over” 
hearing in juvenile court, which effectively transferred the case to the 
adult criminal court.154  The witness had failed to identify Mr. Johnson 
from a photo array the month following the incident.155  At a bind-over 
hearing about seven months later, she pointed out the defendant.156  The 
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Ohio appellate court described the scene:  “[The] defendant was dressed 
in clothing from the Department of Youth Services and may have been 
handcuffed and . . . he was the only young African-American male 
seated at the defense table.”157  Not surprisingly, the decedent’s wife 
identified him.158  Pointing him out, she said, “Those eyes, those eyes.  I 
will never forget those eyes.”159  Later, when Mr. Johnson was tried for 
the murder in adult court, the government sought to introduce the wife’s 
identification, and the defense moved to suppress.160  The trial court 
granted the motion to suppress, but the Tenth District of the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio reversed.161 The appellate court candidly acknowledged 
the suggestive circumstances of the identification at the bind-over 
hearing,162 but concluded that, pursuant to Biggers and Manson, the 
identification was reliable,163 because the witness had seen the two 
gunmen for about “70 to 75 seconds” at the time of the shooting, and that 
she said she was within a few feet of the man who shot her husband 
“staring at the person who had a gun, his eyes.”164  It did not matter, the 
appellate court reasoned, that the witness had earlier failed to pick Mr. 
Johnson from a photo array:  the juvenile court judge and prosecutor at 
the bind-over hearing testified that the witness had been “certain” in her 
identification.165  
Finally, in a Mississippi case, Bynum v. State,166 Tommy Bynum was 
charged with robbery in connection with a purse-snatching.  During the 
incident, the robber had struggled with the victim in a parking lot before 
grabbing her purse.167  The victim testified that the attack lasted several 
seconds.168  One week after the attack, the victim was shown a photo 
array and picked two people out of it—Mr. Bynum and another 
person.169  The victim stated that Mr. Bynum “looked the most like the 
attacker.”170  Four days later, the victim was shown a second photo array.  
This array contained Mr. Bynum’s picture, but not the photograph of the 
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other person that the complainant had picked from the first array.171  
Predictably, the victim picked Mr. Bynum as the assailant, this time 
making the identification “positively and unequivocally.”172  There were 
two other eyewitnesses to the purse-snatching.  One was unable to pick 
the assailant out of a photo array, but later identified Mr. Bynum as the 
robber.173  The third identified Mr. Bynum from a photo line-up and 
testified that he was “100% certain.”174  The defense moved to suppress 
all three eyewitness identifications, but the trial court concluded that 
“the cumulative testimony of the three eyewitnesses identified Bynum” 
as the robber.175  In a conclusory paragraph, the Court of Appeals of 
Mississippi applied the Biggers factors and affirmed denial of the motion 
to suppress,176 without addressing whether it was problematic for the 
trial court to consider the three witnesses’ identifications “cumulatively,” 
in determining whether each identification was reliable. 
Of course, not all courts are blind to Manson’s potential failings when 
that rule is applied reflexively and without any meaningful 
consideration of the actual reliability of the identification.  Some lower 
courts recognize the weaknesses of the Manson test, but nonetheless feel 
bound by precedent to apply it.177 Others conclude that the psychological 
research provides reason to apply Manson carefully,178 and demand rigor 
in its application.179  Still others have rejected or refined the Manson test 
as a matter of state law,180 or mandated rules pursuant to their 
supervisory authority.181  Unfortunately, many other lower courts 
continue to apply Manson mechanically, in a manner that undermines 
the values of “fairness” and “reliability.” 
Again, the point here is not that the cases discussed in this section 
allowed mistaken identifications into evidence.  To our knowledge, the 
defendants in these cases have not been exonerated, and we do not know 
                                                 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 




177 See, e.g., State v. Chance, No. A04-948, 2005 WL 1668890, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 19, 
2005).  “Although it is true that recent research casts substantial doubt over the relationship 
between witness confidence and witness accuracy, any change in established precedent 
must be left to the supreme court.” Id. 
178 See, e.g., Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184 (Colo. 2002) (discussing psychological research 
and remanding for a more complete evidentiary hearing). 
179 See, e.g., Brisco v. Phillips, 376 F. Supp. 2d 306, 319-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
180 See supra note 44-47 (providing constitutional state decisions rejecting Manson). 
181 See supra notes 48-51 (providing decisions under state courts’ supervisory authority). 
132 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
whether any of these individuals have credible claims of actual 
innocence.  The facts recited in these appellate decisions, however, 
provided substantial indications both of unnecessarily suggestive police 
procedures and potential unreliability of the identifications—indications 
that courts applying the Manson test completely ignored in their analysis.  
The purpose in describing these lower court decisions, then, is merely to 
illustrate that the rule of decision announced by Manson produces a type 
of analysis that is not a good fit for the constitutional operative 
propositions of fairness and reliability.  In many instances in the 
reported decisions, courts merely search the record for any evidence of 
the five Manson reliability factors, list them, and conclude summarily 
that the identification was nonetheless reliable.  Although such opinions 
are easy to lampoon, the problem is not just that courts are issuing 
poorly-reasoned decisions.  After all, it is legitimately difficult to make 
case-by-case reliability determinations in an area as subtle as eyewitness 
identifications, and the Manson factors provide courts with a heuristic.  
The problem is that the Manson heuristic is not a good tool for achieving 
the stated goal of reliability. 
V. TOWARDS A NEW RULE OF DECISION 
This Article describes a problem in the world, a problem in the law, 
and the beginnings of a proposed solution.  The problem in the world is 
complicated and somewhat intractable.  Human perception and memory 
are imperfect in nature, but despite their flawed characters, they provide 
evidence that is necessarily the basis of many criminal prosecutions.  The 
problem in the law is that the Manson rule of decision was poorly 
constructed for its task, and has, in Professor Roosevelt’s terms, “lost fit” 
in light of the developments in social science.182  The tough part, of 
course, is the third task—coming up with a proposed rule of decision to 
replace Manson.  Although we do not offer a comprehensive scheme, we 
hope to spark discussion by advocating a decision rule for federal due 
process challenges that includes some minimal affirmative guidelines for 
conducting identification procedures.   
A. Why Due Process Challenges to Identification Procedures Matter 
Not surprisingly, there are a number of ways to address the problem 
of faulty eyewitness identifications, besides suppressing evidence of out-
of-court identification procedures through due process challenges.  
Many experts working in the field have focused their energies at an 
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earlier point in the criminal justice process, attempting to stop erroneous 
identifications from being made through reforms in identification 
procedures.183 Other advocates have focused instead on curative 
measures at trial.  Some have promoted admitting expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification to educate jurors about its problems.184  Still 
others have counseled better jury instructions on the potential problems 
of eyewitness identification.185   
We believe that although such measures are helpful and even 
necessary, they do not alleviate the need to revisit Manson and its rule of 
decision. The strategy of going to the source by improving police 
procedures is clearly an important one, but it will take time.  To date, 
only a few jurisdictions have instituted wholesale reforms.186  The system 
cannot wait for reforms to eyewitness identification procedures to stem 
the tide of faulty identifications.  Moreover, reforms of law enforcement 
practices will not address the problem of the decades of cases that are 
already in the pipeline. 
Many curative measures at trial—such as instructions on eyewitness 
identification or expert testimony—allow suspect eyewitness 
identifications to go to the jury, where their persuasive effect may 
outweigh their reliability.  Most importantly, it is simply not feasible to 
admit an expert in every routine robbery case, particularly given the 
reality of serious funding limitations in indigent defense systems around 
the country.187  As Professor Wells has pointed out, there are probably 
fewer than fifty well-qualified eyewitness identification experts and over 
77,000 eyewitness identification cases per year in the U.S.188   
As for jury instructions, although the law must rely on the 
assumption that jurors follow them,189 their actual efficacy is debatable.  
As Justice Scalia has candidly acknowledged, “The rule that juries are 
                                                 
183 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 37; Wells, Systematic Reforms, 
supra note 54. 
184 See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of 
Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1995); Michael Leippe, The Case for Expert 
Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 909-59 (1995); Edward 
Stein, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness 
Identification, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 295 (2003). 
185 Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra note 32, at 20. 
186 See supra note 54. 
187 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING 
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE—A REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
7 (2005). 
188 Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence, supra note 32, at 19. 
189 See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). 
134 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in 
the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that 
it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the 
state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.”190  Studies of 
juror instructions on eyewitness identification indicate that they are not 
an effective safeguard against wrongful conviction.191 
Many observers, including the Supreme Court in Watkins, suggest 
that cross-examination alone can uncover unreliable identifications.192  
This approach ignores the unique power and danger of eyewitness 
identification testimony. The persuasive effect of eyewitness 
identification testimony has been remarked upon by lawyers and 
commentators for decades.  In his dissent in Watkins, Justice Brennan 
explained that he believed that jurors should know nothing about 
eyewitness identifications subject to suppression because of “[t]he 
powerful impact that much eyewitness identification evidence has on 
juries.”193  Justice Brennan quoted Professor Elizabeth Loftus’s seminal 
work, Eyewitness Testimony:  “All the evidence points rather strikingly to 
the conclusion that there is almost nothing more convincing than a live 
human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and 
says, ‘That’s the one!’”194 
Subsequent scientific research has further confirmed that Justice 
Brennan’s concerns were well-founded. Jurors have a poor 
understanding of factors that can undermine the reliability of eyewitness 
identification.195  Even more troubling, jurors tend to “over-believe” 
eyewitnesses. Studies demonstrate that jurors have difficulty 
distinguishing accurate from inaccurate witnesses.  In one study, mock 
jurors believed 62% of eyewitnesses witnessing in poor conditions, when 
only 33% of such witnesses were in fact accurate.196  In another study, 
eyewitness confidence was a better predictor of conviction by mock 
jurors than eyewitness accuracy.197  In that study, eyewitnesses who 
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identified an innocent suspect convinced 70% of mock jurors to convict, 
while eyewitnesses who identified a guilty party produced only a 68% 
rate of conviction.198  In short, jurors believe eyewitnesses, even when 
they are wrong, and find eyewitness identification testimony so 
persuasive that it may well color their view of all of the other evidence in 
the case. 
Finally, because the use of suggestive procedures and unreliable 
identifications almost always occur with eyewitnesses who honestly 
believe their own mistaken identification, cross-examination is nearly 
useless.  A certain-but-wrong witness will have the demeanor of a truth-
teller and will not be shaken by confrontation.  A paradigmatic example 
of this type of witness is Jennifer Thompson, the courageous woman 
who honestly but mistakenly identified Ronald Cotton as the man who 
raped her, and, after his DNA exoneration eleven years later, came 
forward to say publicly and repeatedly, “I was certain, but I was 
wrong.”199  Research has shown that mistaken witnesses will not only 
genuinely believe in their own identification, but will also now honestly 
remember the circumstances of their identification as being more 
favorable than they truly were.200  Such witnesses cannot be easily 
impeached through a demonstration of objective unreliability, given that 
jurors often do not understand what factors make one seemingly-
convincing identification more reliable than another, and given that 
expert testimony (even where admissible) is impractical to present on a 
routine basis. 
For these reasons, we argue that suppression of out-of-court 
identification procedures that were rendered unreliable by unduly 
suggestive police procedures remains an important part of the solution 
to the problem of faulty identifications.201  And as a result, a new rule of 
decision is required to replace the outmoded Manson test.  But what form 
should this new rule take?   
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B. How To Construct a New Rule of Decision To Replace Manson 
The first and most obvious step in constructing a new rule of 
decision is to disavow the Manson reliability checklist.  The reliability 
factors are not only discredited, they also are poorly suited to the task of 
ensuring fairness and reliability in out-of-court identifications.  Indeed, 
the Manson reliability factors have functioned in such a way as to create 
safe harbor provisions, but not ones that, to borrow Professor Susan 
Klein’s terms “instrumentally advance” Due Process Clause values or 
“offer[ ] bright-line guidance for officers in the field.”202  All too often, if 
a police officer, prosecutor, or trial court elicits a subjective statement of 
confidence from a witness, or a subjective statement that the witness got 
a “good look,” the identification will be deemed reliable and admitted.  
Thus, the Manson checklist creates an incentive to elicit a statement of 
confidence, but not necessarily to use procedures that are reliable.  
Moreover, rote application of factors such as certainty that are 
acknowledged by social science to be only weakly correlated with 
reliability undermines respect for the courts.  As the DNA exonerations 
have now demonstrated, Manson routinely allows the juries to consider 
mistaken eyewitness testimony thus failing in its avowed purpose of 
preventing wrongful convictions based on this testimony.  It is time for 
Manson to go. 
The more difficult question—and the one worthy of discussion—is 
what should replace the Manson rule.  Professor Klein has argued that 
eyewitness identification is a “prime candidate” for “new prophylactic 
. . . procedures to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial in light of the 
unreliability of eyewitness testimony.”203  Acknowledging the social 
science research about the problems of human memory and the weak 
confidence-accuracy correlation, and pointing to the fact that “studies 
have shown misidentification to be one of the most frequent causes of 
the conviction of the innocent[,]” Professor Klein concludes, “The best 
candidate for countering these injustices is a new rule . . . that would 
require proper procedures and guidelines for lineups, show-ups, and 
photo arrays.”204 
Although we agree in large measure, we must recognize at the outset 
that this route was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Manson. In his Manson concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote, “the 
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arguments in favor of fashioning new rules to minimize the danger of 
convicting the innocent on the basis of unreliable eyewitness testimony 
carry substantial force.”205 “Nevertheless,” he concluded, “I am 
persuaded that this rulemaking function can be performed ‘more 
effectively by the legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy judicial 
fiat,’ and that the Federal Constitution does not foreclose 
experimentation by the States in the development of such rules.”206 
But it must be remembered that the Manson debate occurred in a 
different time and under different circumstances than the current debate 
over the proper role of eyewitness identification testimony in the judicial 
system.  The social science has evolved and changed dramatically, as we 
have pointed out elsewhere in this Article.  In addition, the Manson 
Court did not have thirty years worth of evidence demonstrating that a 
reliability test would be completely ineffective in protecting the judicial 
system from the dangers of mistaken eyewitness testimony.  We now 
know to a certainty, however, that such convictions have occurred fairly 
routinely and that Manson has done nothing to prevent them.  In fact, 
because jurors tend to over-value eyewitness identification testimony, 
Manson may have affirmatively contributed to the conviction of the 
innocent.207 
Moreover, the criminal justice landscape itself has changed 
dramatically since Manson.  Indeed, as recently as 1995, just before the 
explosion of DNA exonerations become known, the Supreme Court 
described meritorious innocence claims as “extremely rare.” 208  In the 
past decade, however, literally hundreds of DNA exonerations have 
provided irrefutable evidence that wrongful convictions are far less 
“rare” than anyone—including advocates for the innocent—ever 
imagined.  Thus, although Justice Stevens’s cautious attitude toward 
limitations on the use of eyewitness evidence was certainly warranted 
based on what was known in 1977, it is impossible to justify similar 
caution today—when we know both that the Manson approach has failed 
and that substantial agreement has arisen in the social science 
community over the efficacy of certain police procedures in the 
eyewitness context.   
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In light of this emerging consensus, the Court should adopt a 
decision rule that institutes minimum affirmative guidelines for the 
conduct of identification procedures. These guidelines would be selected 
to address major issues affecting the structural integrity of the 
procedures—not to dictate every step.  Identifications that run afoul of 
the minimum guidelines would be excluded.  However, courts also 
would remain free in extraordinary cases to exclude identifications that 
are the products of procedures that, while complying with the minimum 
guidelines, are nonetheless so suggestive as to render the identification 
unreliable.   
The single most important guideline would be the implementation 
of double-blind procedures, “in which the administrator is not in a 
position to unintentionally influence the witness’s selection.”209  A report 
by the National Institute of Justice in 1999 explained that “investigators’ 
unintentional cues (e.g., body language, tone of voice) may negatively 
impact the reliability of eyewitness evidence,” and that “such influences 
could be avoided if ‘blind’ identification procedures were employed.”210  
For this reason, double blind procedures are a fundamental part of 
scientific and social science research.211  If double-blind procedures are 
used, they will automatically eliminate a number of problems that the 
social science research has documented, including the experimenter-
expectancy effect and the problem of confirming feedback.212  Such 
protections may be even more important in the context of a criminal 
investigation, because, as Professors Findley and Scott have recently 
described in their article on the problem of tunnel vision, police and 
other investigators are under tremendous pressure to close criminal 
cases and remove violent criminals from the streets.213   
Other fundamental affirmative guidelines for any such rule of 
decision could track the recommendations of the U.S. Department of 
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Justice National Institute of Justice Eyewitness Evidence Guide for Law 
Enforcement,214 the 2004 American Bar Association report on eyewitness 
testimony,215 or the Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Evidence 
recently adopted by the State of Wisconsin.216  Professor Taslitz has 
advocated the adoption of a number of measures recommended in the 
ABA report, practices “so strongly supported by the scientific research 
and so essential to avoiding mistaken identifications that ignoring any 
one of these requirements should presumptively constitute a due process 
violation.”217 
Obviously, “non-suspect fillers [should be] chosen to minimize any 
suggestiveness that might point toward the suspect.”218  Law 
enforcement should “[s]eparate witnesses and instruct them to avoid 
discussing details of the incident with other witnesses.”219  In addition, 
law enforcement should “[a]void multiple identification procedures in 
which the same witness views the same suspect more than once.”220  
Officers also should caution witnesses prior to viewing a photo array or 
line-up, with instructions that track those suggested by the DOJ, 
informing them that:  (1) “it is just as important to clear innocent persons 
from suspicion as to identify guilty parties”; (2) “individuals present in 
the lineup may not appear exactly as they did on the date of the 
incident”; (3) “the person who committed the crime may or may not be 
present in the group of individuals”; and (4) “regardless of whether an 
identification is made, the police will continue to investigate the 
incident.”221  Finally, each witness should be asked to make a statement 
of how certain she is of her pick immediately after making the 
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identification, in order to avoid the distorting effects of post-
identification feedback.222   
The proposed solution of affirmative minimum guidelines for line-
ups and photo arrays helps to address the problem in the real world.  A 
decision rule with affirmative guidelines provides clear guidance to law 
enforcement, and possesses significant deterrence value.  Affirmative 
guidelines are not equivalent to, and, indeed, are far superior to, the per 
se exclusion rule advocated by the prisoner and dissenters in Manson.223  
While a per se exclusionary rule would penalize police for procedures 
deemed after the fact to be impermissibly suggestive—forcing police to 
guess about what is allowed—affirmative guidelines provide true ex ante 
guidance.  This is the same benefit as the Miranda rule:  clear, simple 
guidelines that are relatively simple for the police to integrate into their 
work.224  While police might engage in gamesmanship to circumvent the 
rules, with clear guidelines, courts are able to clamp down on such 
practices, as the Supreme Court did recently in condemning “question-
first” practices that undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda 
warning.225   
Moreover, while many exclusionary rules restrict the availability of 
otherwise reliable evidence, our proposed decision rule excludes only 
evidence for which the government has foregone easily available means 
of ensuring reliability.  Thus, it has the added benefit of aiding the truth-
seeking process.  Put differently, our rule could reduce the number of 
mistaken identifications.  For example, police would not have shown 
Ronald Cotton’s photo to Jennifer Thompson before asking her to make a 
pick from a live lineup in which he participated.226  They would not have 
instructed her to choose the man who looked the most like her 
assailant.227  Ms. Thompson would have been asked to state her 
subjective level of certainty at the time she made her identification, so 
that it was not inflated later by repeated questioning, the effects of trial 
preparation, or confirming feedback from police or prosecutors.  
Although we will never know for sure, these measures could have 
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helped to avert the wrongful conviction of Ronald Cotton, obviously 
benefiting Mr. Cotton, saving Ms. Thompson much anguish, and 
protecting the community from Bobby Poole. 
The proposed decision rule also addresses the problem in the law.  
Any decision rule that is adopted will sometimes exclude reliable 
identifications, or admit unreliable identifications.228  A rule with 
proposed affirmative guidelines, however, would be easier for courts to 
administer than the Manson test.  It would also put the focus where it 
should be—on unnecessarily suggestive police procedures—rather than 
on attempting to discern whether an identification is, in fact, reliable.  
This type of determination is better-suited to courts’ institutional 
competence, and the resulting analysis would be a better fit to the 
constitutional operative propositions of the Due Process Clause—
fairness and reliability.   
An example helps to illustrate the benefits of our proposed rule of 
decision.  In Wong, the Green Dragon gang member case, rather than 
struggling to determine whether a witness’s fleeting glimpse of a 
gunman was reliable, the court would have had clear direction to 
exclude the identification when it learned that the detectives had 
pressured her to make an identification, saying, “we can’t just take a 
‘possibly.’”229  Conversely, a court that knew that detectives had adhered 
scrupulously to the minimum guidelines would not have been forced to 
become mired in details about the witness’s view of the gunman, 
subjective level of certainty, etc.  The court could have been certain both 
that it was applying a clear rule correctly, and that the use of the 
guideline procedures would have reduced the likelihood of an actual 
mistake.   
The affirmative guidelines set out by the Court under our proposed 
rule of decision would be the minimum requirements for identification 
procedures, not necessarily co-extensive with the requirements of due 
process.  In Professor Lawrence Sager’s terms, the federal constitutional 
rule of decision would “under-enforce” due process.230  Professor 
Monaghan and others have suggested that prophylactic rules such as 
those set out in Miranda over-enforce constitutional norms mandating 
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more than the Constitution requires.231  On the other hand, the proposed 
decision rule is interstitial, and does not attempt to catalogue all of the 
ways in which an identification procedure might be so unnecessarily 
suggestive as to violate due process.  Conversely, we do not pretend to 
imagine all of the reforms that might reduce the likelihood of false 
identification.  Other branches of the federal government, state and local 
governments, and various law enforcement agencies would remain free 
to enact more detailed or protective rules for conducting identification 
procedures, as Justice Stevens suggested in his Manson concurrence.232  
Professor Klein has explained that this type of approach “allows the 
Court to change the rules by accepting alternate rules provided by 
Congress, state legislators, federal and state law enforcement agencies 
and state judges, who may have better knowledge of the circumstances 
encountered or facts on the ground, and who may be better 
institutionally-suited to playing factfinder.”233   
Certainly, there are useful measures that local jurisdictions might 
choose to implement that are not included on the list.  For example, 
Wisconsin has chosen to implement sequential line-up rules, because 
most research demonstrates that the sequential line-up format—in which 
the suspect and fillers are presented one at a time instead of 
simultaneously—reduces the relative judgment problem.234  Local 
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jurisdictions also may choose to require videotaping of identification 
procedures, as the American Bar Association study recommended.235  
Videotaping would enable defense counsel, the court, and fact-finders to 
assess the fairness of these procedures and the witness’s apparent level 
of certainty at the time the witness made his or her pick, before the 
distorting effects of any type of post-identification feedback.  While these 
two measures may be extremely worthwhile and reduce the number of 
faulty identifications, the list of fundamental affirmative guidelines does 
not include them because they are more resource-intensive, more 
difficult to implement, and not as fundamental to the overall integrity of 
the identification process. 
The proposed affirmative guidelines would apply to identification 
line-ups and photo arrays.  “Show-up” procedures, in which a single 
suspect is displayed to the witness, usually shortly after the offense, 
obviously raise suggestivity concerns as well.  However, without data 
about how often show-ups conducted close in time to an incident clear 
innocent suspects, we are reluctant to call for a complete ban.  And 
hopefully technology will soon progress to the point where police with 
laptops and digital cameras can construct photo arrays in their squad 
cars.  For the time being, however, a version of the Stovall or Dubose rules 
should be used for show-ups.   
In Stovall, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he practice of 
showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and 
not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned,” but nonetheless 
concluded that the confrontation in the witness’s hospital room was 
“imperative,” given that the witness might not have lived long enough 
to make another identification.236  Unfortunately, as discussed in Part III, 
in Simmons, Biggers, and Manson, the Supreme Court turned the focus 
from the necessity of using the challenged procedure to the overall 
reliability of the witness’s identification.  Subsequently, commentators 
have urged that the Stovall rule be resurrected with respect to show-
ups.237  In a 2005 show-up case, Wisconsin v. Dubose, the Wisconsin 
                                                                                                             
Hennepin study are summarized in a hand-out by Dr. Nancy Steblay.  Nancy Steblay, 
Observations on the Illinois Lineup Data, http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/ 
gwells/Steblay_Observations_on_the_Illinois_Data.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).  This 
area is ripe for additional field research, particularly after researchers design a set of 
protocols that can avoid some of the problems in the Illinois study. 
235 RESOLUTION ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 215. 
236 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
237 Jessica Lee, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects from Consequences of 
Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755 (2005). 
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Supreme Court announced that “evidence obtained from an out-of-court 
showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary.”238   
In applying a Stovall-Dubose rule to show-ups, courts should make 
clear that they must be conducted soon after the incident:  research has 
demonstrated that witnesses’ show-up identifications become markedly 
less reliable twenty-four hours after a crime.239  In addition, although a 
Stovall-Dubose rule would allow imperative or exigent show-ups, the 
Dubose Court has said that it does not permit other types of suggestivity 
commonly seen in show-up cases—the presence of handcuffs or squad 
cars, for example.240   
C. Potential Criticisms of a Rule of Decision Based on Affirmative Guidelines 
A number of potential criticisms of the proposed rule of decision can 
be anticipated.  Some will object to the proposal because they doubt the 
legitimacy of prophylactic rules generally.  It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to mount a full-scale defense of the legitimacy of so-called 
prophylactic rules. But those rules have a substantial pedigree in 
American jurisprudence, which is why a variety of legal scholars have 
continued to defend their use.  Legal scholars beginning with Professor 
David Strauss have defended prophylactic rules by questioning the 
subdivision of types of constitutional interpretation, arguing that 
“[c]onstitutional law is filled with rules that are justified in ways that are 
analytically indistinguishable from the justifications for the Miranda 
rules.”241  More recently, but in a similar vein, Professor Daryl Levinson 
has criticized “rights essentialism,” arguing that “[r]ights are dependent 
on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their 
scope, shape, and very existence.”242   
Although prophylactic rules have been called into question by some 
commentators,243 and criticized by some Supreme Court justices in the 
Miranda context,244 the Court has continued to utilize such rules in 
appropriate cases.  Indeed, Professor Roosevelt has pointed out that the 
                                                 
238 State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (Wis. 2005). 
239 Lee, supra note 237, at 770.  See A.D. Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications 
in Show-ups and Lineup, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 464 (1996). 
240 Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594. 
241 Strauss, supra note 59, at 195. 
242 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
858-59 (1999). 
243 See Grano, supra note 97. 
244 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Court, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice 
Scalia, has adopted such an approach to the procedure for appointed 
appellate counsel for indigents who conclude that an appeal is frivolous 
and move to withdraw.245  The Court set out a procedure for such 
lawyers to follow in Anders v. California,246 but, in Smith v. Robbins, the 
Court made clear that the Anders procedure was “a prophylactic one,” 
and that “the States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as 
those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant’s right to appellate 
counsel.”247   
Having employed Professor Berman’s lexicon of “constitutional 
operative propositions” and “decision rules” throughout this Article, we 
are in some sense what Professor Berman might describe as 
“taxonomists”—that is, we find labels to be helpful in discussing 
different types of constitutional interpretation.248  But, while a 
willingness to use labels has often been associated with criticism of 
prophylactic rules,249 there is no meaningful difference between so-called 
prophylactic rules and other forms of judicial remedies.  As Professor 
Roosevelt has argued, decision rules may or may not closely track 
operative constitutional provisions; they may over-enforce or under-
enforce, depending on issues including (as catalogued by Professor 
Roosevelt): institutional competence, costs of error, frequency of 
unconstitutional action, legislative pathologies, enforcement costs, and 
the need for guidance for other government actors.250  Professor Fallon 
has used the term “judicially manageable standards” to describe the tests 
that the Court crafts, which he says are distinct from the “constitutional 
norms” themselves.251  In other words, so-called prophylactic rules are 
just another type of decision rule or judicially manageable standard, and 
such rules are common in constitutional adjudication.252  
Adopting an affirmative statement of procedures as a decision rule 
can lessen the adjudicative burden on the lower courts.  Professor 
Strauss has explained that the Supreme Court adopted the Miranda rule 
of decision because “a case-by-case review . . . was severely testing its 
                                                 
245 Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 1671. 
246 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
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capacities, and those of the lower courts.”253  Professor Roosevelt 
concurs:  “the voluntariness determination was difficult for courts to 
make on the basis of a paper record that might reveal very little about 
the actual tone and tenor of an interrogation.”254  This rationale holds 
true in the context of eyewitness identification procedures as well.  Just 
as a case-by-case determination of voluntariness strained the courts in 
the coerced confessions cases, case-by-case determinations of reliability 
impose burdens on the lower courts.  Professor Andrew Taslitz has 
argued that “freestanding due process has often generated specific 
doctrines too weak to serve the goal of truth-seeking,” in particular 
choosing “flexible utilitarian balancing tests” over clear rules.255  Indeed, 
one way of understanding the rote application of the Manson reliability 
factors is as a reaction to a task that is very difficult, resource-intensive, 
and not suited to the tool that has been provided.   
Other advocates and commentators may criticize the proposed rule 
of decision for a different reason—arguing that the Court should either 
adopt a per se rule of exclusion or broaden the Dubose rule beyond the 
show-up context, to exclude unnecessarily suggestive line-ups and photo 
arrays that were not necessary under the circumstances.256  Professor 
Keith Findley of the University of Wisconsin, amicus in Dubose, would 
argue that an advantage of the Dubose rule of decision is that it can be 
revised easily in light of emerging social science. Rather than 
incorporating the current social science literature directly into the 
constitutional rule of decision, it places the responsibility on the defense 
bar to keep abreast of the developments in the research and argue that 
outdated procedures are unnecessarily suggestive.257  
There are many good things about the Dubose rule.  It is certainly 
preferable to Manson, and, in fact, as discussed above, a Dubose rule for 
show-ups should be used.  Nonetheless, prophylactic rules for line-ups 
and photo arrays possess a number of advantages.  First, they provide ex 
ante guidance to the police, which will reduce the number of mistaken 
identifications and relieve courts of making after-the-fact assessments of 
whether the police procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.  Second, 
they provide structure for trial courts’ assessments, so that they do not 
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devolve into the type of rote and mechanistic analysis described in Part 
IV.  The Dubose rule shifts the focus from the reliability to the 
suggestivity prong of Manson.  In the context of show-ups, the analysis is 
straightforward:  a show-up is easy to identify, and the Dubose Court 
said that show-ups are “inherently suggestive.”258  However, the 
suggestivity determination for line-ups and photo arrays is less clear-cut 
(for example, does the background or the lighting draw attention to the 
suspect?).  Under Manson, trial courts currently issue at least as many 
superficial suggestivity analyses as reliability determinations, albeit 
some of the most egregious are in the show-up context.259  We fear that a 
per se exclusion or Dubose rule for photo arrays and line-ups would 
generate even more empty suggestivity decisions. 
Perhaps the most significant argument against our proposal for 
prophylactic rules is that affirmative guidelines based on the social 
science at the time of their adoption will not keep pace with new 
research findings.  The response is that the prophylactic rules proposed 
are not intended to dictate an elaborate set of procedures, but rather to 
set a minimum floor based on fundamental safeguards.  The affirmative 
guidelines advocated—such as double-blind procedures—are nearly 
universally accepted among the research community. Improved 
eyewitness identification procedures that remain the subject of research 
and debate—for example sequential identification procedures—could be 
adopted by state and local governments but would not be mandated by 
the prophylactic rules we advance. 
Even if the Supreme Court is reluctant to adopt a decision rule for 
federal due process challenges that includes affirmative guidelines for 
identification procedures, it should adopt such rules for identification 
procedures in the federal system as a matter of its supervisory 
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authority,260 as the New Jersey Supreme Court did in Delgado.261  In 
Dickerson, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it possesses 
supervisory authority over the federal courts, and that it “may use that 
authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding 
in those tribunals.”262  Implementing eyewitness identification 
procedures under the Court’s supervisory authority would not only 
improve the quality of adjudication in the federal system, but also would 
promote further debate about how to guard against faulty 
identifications.  This is a worthy goal in and of itself. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The problem of faulty eyewitness identifications is an enduring one, 
which probably will remain with us as long as human beings witness 
crimes.  Nonetheless, we must confront the problem and remedy what 
we can, given the current state of the science.  Much is at stake: the lives 
of the wrongly accused like Ronald Cotton; the peace-of-mind of honest 
but mistaken victims like Jennifer Thompson; and the safety of 
communities in which true offenders remain on the street while the 
wrongfully convicted languish behind bars.  Even more fundamentally, 
the legitimacy of our criminal justice system is shaken when an 
unreliable identification is admitted, particularly one that is the product 
of suggestive police procedures. 
The Manson test erodes the integrity of the system not only because, 
like other elements of criminal procedure, it sometimes gets cases wrong.  
At an even more fundamental level, applying a decision rule that has not 
kept pace with the science, and that invites rote analysis, threatens the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system.  No one benefits when some of 
the most significant decisions in criminal prosecutions are made based 
on meaningless formalisms. 
It is time to revisit Manson.  We hope that this Article will contribute 
to serious debate about how best to construct a decision rule to replace 
Manson, and about whether minimum affirmative guidelines for 
identification procedures can play a role in that project. 
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